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Abstract:  Market efficiency is analysed for the Iberian Power Futures Market and other 
European Power Markets, as well as other fuel markets through evaluation of ex-post 
Forward Risk Premium. The equilibrium price from compulsory call auctions for 
distribution companies within the framework of the Iberian Power Futures Market is not 
optimal for remuneration purposes as it seems to be slightly upward biased, though such a 
premium is not significant (only around 2% above the average of Settlement Prices). In the 
period considered (August 2006 to September 2008), monthly futures contracts behave 
similarly to quarterly contracts. Average risk premia have been positive in power and 
natural gas markets but negative in oil and coal markets. Different hypotheses are tested 
regarding increasing volatility with maturity and regarding Forward Risk Premium 
correlations (negative with variance of spot prices during delivery period and positive with 
skewness of spot prices during delivery period). Enlarged data sets are recommended for 
stronger test results. Energy markets tend to show limited levels of market efficiency. 
Regarding the emerging Iberian Power Futures Market, price efficiency is improved with 
market development and with further integration of European Regional Power Markets.  
Keywords: Iberian power futures market, market efficiency, forward risk premium 
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1 Introduction 
Since its beginning in July 2006, the Iberian Power Futures Market managed by 
OMIP (“Iberian Forward Market Operator”), within the framework of the Iberian 
Electricity Market (MIBEL), has experienced a continuous development, in terms of 
number of participants and liquidity. At this moment, 28 market players participate 
in OMIP. Almost half of them (12) belong to Iberian energy incumbents (vertically 
integrated energy groups with separated generation and distribution companies). 
Only 6 members are pure financial agents, still a reduced figure. Additionally, only 
one market maker has been active quoting monthly contracts in the periods 
September 2007 – March 2008 and May 2008 – October 2008. The main amount of 
traded energy in OMIP is still driven by compulsory call auctions according to 
national regulations aimed at fostering the MIBEL. The Spanish Distribution 
Companies and the Portuguese Last Resort Supplier with more than 100.000 
clients are obliged to purchase in these auctions, in order to partly cover their 
portfolios of end-user regulated supplies. Such an obligation comprises 5% of their 
regulated supplies, for the second half of year 2006, as agreed by MIBEL Council of 
Regulators in the Évora Summit (November 2005), and published in the 
corresponding legislation (Spanish Order ITC/2129/2006 and Portuguese “Portaria” 
643/2006), and 10% for year 2007 onwards, as agreed in the Badajoz Summit 
(November 2006), and published in Spanish Order ITC/3990/2006 and Portuguese 
Dispatch 780/2007 (for first half of year 2007), Spanish Order ITC/1865/2007 and 
Portuguese Dispatch /2007 of 29 June 2007 (for second half of year 2007 and first 
half of year 2008), and Spanish Order ITC/1934/2008 and Portuguese Dispatch 
19098/2008 (for second half of year 2008) (Fernández & Xiberta, 2007). 
As shown in Figure 1, since the last quarter of 2007 the amount of energy traded 
in the OMIP Continuous Market has grown slightly compared to previous trading 
levels, with a record in June 2008, though it is still less than the auctioned 
amounts. In the period spanning from the start of OMIP Continuous Market (July 
3rd 2006) until end of September 2008, the accumulated amount of energy traded 
in OMIP call auctions is more than five times bigger than in the continuous market. 
Despite the record level in June 2008, no generalised trend of increasing volumes 
is appreciated in the continuous market. In the compulsory call auctions, the 
volumes tend to differ each 6 months due to introduction of the aforementioned 
regulation (Spanish “Order ITC” or Portuguese “Despacho”). Therefore, liquidity of 
this market is still reduced compared to other European Power Futures Markets.  
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Figure 1. “Evolution of trading levels (GWh) in OMIP Call Auctions and OMIP Continuous 
Market”. Source: OMIP 
Empirical evaluation of the Efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures Market is done 
to assess the situation of this emerging market. This information is of special 
interest both for all MIBEL market players and for MIBEL Regulatory Committee in 
charge of MIBEL market supervision. This Committee is composed of the national 
energy and securities regulatory agencies, namely, Spanish CNE (Comisión 
Nacional de Energía) and CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores), and 
Portuguese ERSE (Entidade Reguladora do Sector Energético) and CMVM 
(Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários), as established in the “Agreement 
between the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain relative to the 
constitution of an Iberian Electrical Energy Market” – the so-called MIBEL 
Agreement – signed by the respective governments, on October 1st 2004. 
In order to perform this evaluation, literature review regarding market efficiency is 
done. Diverse tests are performed to assess if the price formation in OMIP call 
auctions is satisfactory, and to compare OMIP settlement prices with other 
European Power Futures Markets as well as other Fuel Markets. In all these tests, 
the studied parameter is the ex-post Forward Risk Premium, defined as the 
difference between the average settlement price of a futures contract and the 
resulting average spot price during delivery (Furió & Meneu, 2007). The 
methodology employed in each test and its derived results are provided in separate 
Sections, one per each test. Finally, the conclusions of this study summarise the 
findings of this research. 
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2 Literature review about market efficiency 
A short literature review of Market Efficiency is provided, focused on energy 
markets, and especially, in power markets compared to other commodities and to 
other financial markets. Market efficiency mainly refers in this context about how 
well the future price predicts the spot price. 
Cointegration tests as well as tests for measuring if the forward price is an 
unbiased forecast for cash price for commodity and power markets show that 
Futures Markets are efficient in the long-term, but not in the short-term, even if 
risk neutrality is neglected and a risk premium is assumed. In practice, the 
hypothesis claiming that forward price is an unbiased forecast of future cash price 
(“Efficient Market Hypothesis”) is usually rejected (Engel, 1996).   
According to statistics and econometric research, many commodity futures markets 
existing since the middle of the 19th Century are not efficient. Power Markets are 
considerably younger than Commodity Markets due to the deregulation trend in the 
90’s. Power Markets differ from other markets since electricity storage is very 
limited. There are many studies for the US and European Power Markets, analysing 
the behaviour and interactions of their different regional markets. Nord Pool is the 
oldest Power Exchange. It was founded as a Norwegian Power Exchange in 1993 
(“Statnett Marked AS”) and became a Nordic Power Exchange in 1996 as the 
Swedish System Operator (Svenska Kraftnät) became one of the main 
shareholders. In 1998 Finland enrolled to this market, followed by Western 
Denmark in 1999, and by Eastern Denmark in 2000. Power markets differ from 
other markets as the underlying good is fundamentally not storable. Nevertheless, 
in the Nordic market, a significant part of power production is from hydro 
reservoirs, playing such hydropower inventory an important role in the pricing of 
electricity (STEM, 2006).    
Regarding energy markets, Serletis (1992) examines the effects of maturity on 
futures price volatility and trading volume for 129 energy futures contracts traded 
in New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) in the beginning of the 90’s. The results 
provide support for the maturity effect hypothesis theoretically demonstrated by 
Samuelson (1965). In the empirical research performed by Serletis, energy futures 
prices do become more volatile and trading volume increases as futures contracts 
approach maturity. As the majority of the studies testing Samuelson hypothesis 
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are applied for US Futures markets, Allen and Cruickshank (2002) prefer to 
research with commodity futures on the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE), the 
London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE), and the 
Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). They also find evidence of 
Samuelson hypothesis in the majority of the contracts analysed. Samuelson 
assumed that competitive forces in the futures market cause spot and futures price 
to converge at expiry. Futures price volatility can be associated with the amount of 
information available in a market. Little information is known regarding distant 
contracts compared to contracts closer to expiration. Thus as maturity approaches, 
the amount of information reflecting the fundamentals of the spot asset increases, 
causing large changes in the futures prices and consequently intensifying price 
volatility. These results are important to many participants in futures markets as 
volatility has implications for hedgers and speculators who try to optimise their 
positions with respect to the level of price variability. In markets compliant with 
Samuelson hypothesis, speculators may find it beneficial to trade in contracts 
closer to expiry as greater volatility implies greater short-term profit opportunities. 
Hedgers would benefit from trading in longer dated contracts as lower volatility 
would require less hedges. 
Regarding US Power markets, there are many studies comparing different regional 
markets. Research by Arciniegas, Barrett and Marathe (2003) shows that the 
Pennsylvania/New Jersey/Maryland (PJM) Power Market and the California Power 
Market are more efficient than the New York Power Market. They find that 
efficiency has risen with the maturity of the markets, as players have learnt to take 
advantage of arbitrage opportunities. They also find that a multi-settlement 
scheduling system leads to higher efficiency. A multi-settlement system implies 
that the prices and quantities established in market phases prior to dispatch are 
binding forward contracts. Their study is built with hourly prices of day-ahead and 
real-time markets. They consider that a market is efficient when all the relevant 
and ascertainable information is fully and immediately reflected in market prices. 
Therefore all players are well informed and adjust their market strategies to profit 
from arbitrage opportunities. Their literature review confirms that important 
differences in market structure and in the organisation of forward markets across 
US states may explain differences in market efficiency. California was the only 
market where competing scheduling coordinators ran the forward markets. In PJM 
and New York markets, the Independent System Operator (ISO) who centralized 
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the day-ahead market competed with bilateral markets. An ISO can use its power 
as grid manager to favour its day-ahead market undermining its efficiency. In the 
summer of 2000 in California, one player (PG&E) tried to exercise monopsony 
power, being this a possible cause of the large differences between the forward and 
spot prices in that period. PJM is the most liquid market in the East coast due to its 
bigger number of participants attracted because of lower transaction costs and by 
PJM reputation of delivering transparent and reliable information. New York power 
market lacked transparency in delivering information. They claim that more 
aggressive competition should lead to faster learning and more efficiency. In PJM, 
where utilities could fix prices through long term contracts, price volatility was less 
than in California, where utilities were not allowed to access to long term contracts 
and more than 90% of the power was purchased in the spot market. The lower 
volatility in energy prices may lead to fewer arbitrage opportunities and a more 
efficient and stable market. Good interconnection of regional markets brings 
efficiency and stability in the involved power markets. Additionally, disparity in the 
competition level of international power markets arises from differences in market 
design. Avsar and Goss (2001) study market efficiency for the PJM and the 
California Power Markets and cannot reject the Efficient Market Hypothesis for the 
period July 1998-March 1999, but cannot accept it for the whole data period. They 
find remarkable learning effects from market agents. Additionally, market 
efficiency is linked to market maturity. In this sense, market players in Power 
Markets seem to learn faster than in oil markets, for instance, increasing its 
efficiency with time (Walls, 1999). Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) consider 
that electricity cannot be economically stored and therefore, arbitrage-based 
methods are not applicable for pricing power derivative contracts. They build an 
equilibrium model implying that the forward power price is a downward biased 
predictor of the future spot price if expected power demand is low and demand risk 
is moderate. The equilibrium forward premium increases when either expected 
demand or demand variance is high, due to positive skewness induced in the spot 
power price distribution. Optimal forward positions for power producing and 
retailing firms depend on forecast power demand and on skewness of power prices. 
Premium in forward power prices is positively related to expected demand, and is 
large during summer. Shawky, Marathe and Barrett (2003) attribute the high price 
volatility of US deregulated power markets to the nature of how electricity is 
produced and consumed, inelastic demand, seasonal effects and nonstorability of 
electricity. They investigate the empirical relation between daily spot and futures 
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electricity prices traded on NYMEX and delivered at California-Oregon Border (COB) 
during years 1998-1999. They find that the behaviour of the electricity market is 
consistent with efficient markets. Due to unique features of electricity as a 
nonstorable commodity and the relatively few players on the generation and 
wholesale demand sides, they find that electricity futures differ significantly from 
other commodities as the former present larger estimates of forward risk premium 
and larger hedge ratios. The hedge ratio is defined as the ratio of the position 
taken in the futures contracts that will exactly offset the size of the exposure in the 
spot market. The larger forward risk premium may be required to bring equilibrium 
to a futures market where supply and demand conditions are much volatile and 
may also be caused by limited participation of financial players. Due to the unique 
characteristics of electricity, the price volatility in the spot market is many times 
higher than in the futures market. Positive shocks to spot prices have significantly 
more impact on both current and futures values of electricity than shocks to 
futures prices. Shocks to both spot and futures returns appear to be relatively 
short-lived (half-life of 4-5 days) before they converge to their long-run 
equilibrium.  
Regarding European power markets, the largest number of studies exists for Nord 
Pool, the most developed power market in Europe since its foundation in 1993 
(e.g. Byström, 2003). Byström concludes that traditional simple price hedging 
models are almost equally efficient as the most advanced ones. Therefore, hedging 
at Nord Pool (or whatever Power Futures Market) does not request more advanced 
models than from other financial markets though underlying product features differ 
noticeably from other financial or commodities products. Lucia and Schwartz 
(2000) analyse Nord Pool spot, futures and forward prices during years 1998-1999 
and conclude that the seasonal systematic pattern of spot electricity prices 
throughout the year is of crucial importance in explaining the shapes of the futures 
and forward curve. They detect that a simple sinusoidal embedded in their one and 
two factor models captures the seasonal pattern of the futures and forward curve. 
Their models include a deterministic component reflecting remarkable regularities 
in the behaviour of electricity prices. They find that volatility of Nord Pool spot 
system price is consistently different between cold and warm seasons. They detect 
that transportation constraints for electricity make electricity contracts and prices 
highly local, i.e. strongly dependent on the local determinants of supply and 
demand (e.g. local generation plants, local climate, and local uses of electricity). 
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Additionally, regulatory issues such as market rules and market structure may also 
impact on prices behaviour in competitive electricity markets and on their 
differences across countries. 
The researches regarding European markets are usually focused on the Regional 
Integration of the Power Markets (e.g., Armstrong and Galli, 2005; Zachmann, 
2005). Armstrong and Galli study European wholesale spot power prices and detect 
a price convergence between the price differences. Zachmann also finds a price 
convergence during the 2002-2004 period between Dutch and German wholesale 
power prices but not between East Danish and German prices. He concludes that it 
is necessary to overcome the bottlenecks in the physical interconnection capacity 
in order to achieve an integration of the European Power Market.    
Conclusions from existing studies measuring the efficiency of Futures Markets vary 
considerably. Reviewed literature shows no uniformity regarding the results 
provided by the existing measuring methods. The selected method can slightly bias 
the results. Additionally, the most advanced models may question previous results 
from older and simpler models. More advanced models tend to confirm market 
efficiency but older ones may be prone to reject it. In general, it seems that 
commodity, energy, and even power markets are not especially efficient (STEM, 
2006).  
3 Ex-post forward risk premium definition 
This research is focused on the analysis of the Forward Risk Premium in the Iberian 
Power Futures Market comparing different settlement price criteria and comparing 
the magnitudes of such Risk Premium with other European Power Markets and 
even other Fuel Markets of interest. There are some studies regarding market 
efficiency based on the evaluation of the Forward Risk Premium. Some of those 
studies are based on theoretical “ex-ante” analysis by modelling forecasted spot 
prices. Other studies use empirical data and evaluate “ex-post” differences 
between the Futures and Spot prices. This research represents an empirical 
evaluation using the “ex-post” Forward Risk Premium.  
The “ex-ante” Forward Risk Premium (“Δex-ante”) can be matematically expressed as 
follows: 
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Δex-ante  = Ft,T - Et(ST) 
Equation 1. “Ex-ante Forward Risk Premium”. Source: e.g. Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002 
Where Ft,T  refers to the Futures power price observed on day “t” for delivery over 
period “T”, and Et(ST) refers to Expected Spot price on day “t” for delivery over 
period “T”. 
The “ex-post” Forward Risk Premium (“Δex-post”) can be matematically expressed as 
follows: 
Δex-post  = Ft,T - Average(ST) 
Equation 2. “Ex-post Forward Risk Premium”. Source: e.g. Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002 
Where Average(ST) refers to average spot price for delivery over period T.  
In this research, the considered Futures contracts are baseload and with monthly 
and quarterly maturity. Three European Power Markets are considered, with all 
their prices in €/MWh: OMIP (Iberian Market; the underlying spot prices are taken 
from OMIE, “Iberian Energy Market Operator, Spanish Pool”), Powernext (French 
Market), and Nord Pool (Nordic Market). The considered fuel markets correspond to 
oil (InterContinental Exchange (ICE) Brent futures; only monthly futures are 
analysed, expressed in US$/Bbl), natural gas (ICE monthly futures and Over The 
Counter (OTC) quarterly Platts’ assessments, all related to the British National 
Balancing Point (NBP), and expressed in GB pence/therm), and coal (European 
Energy Exchange (EEX) Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) Coal Futures, 
related to the underlying Argus McCloskey weekly spot index, expressed in US$/t). 
As different monetary units and energy units are used (original units for each 
market), Forward Risk Premium expressed in percentage over the futures price is 
preferred when comparing all these markets. Such an expression is matematically 
written as follows:  
Δex-post %  = [Ft,T - Average(ST)] / Ft,T  
Equation 3. “Ex-post Forward Risk Premium, in percentage over Futures price”. Source: Furió 
and Meneu, 2007 
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The selected period for the study embraces since the very beginning of OMIP 
market (first trading day was July 3rd July 2006) until the end of September 2008. 
Therefore, the monthly contracts span from August 2006 to September 2008, and 
the quarterly ones from Q4-06 to Q3-08. 
4 Test 1: Efficiency assessment of OMIP Call Auction Equilibrium Prices 
4.1 Methodology 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Spanish Local Distribution Companies (and 
the Portuguese Last Resort Supplier) are obliged to purchase during the second 
half of year 2006 5% of their regulated power supplies (10% from year 2007 
onwards) in OMIP call auctions. If they do not comply with such obligations, each 
national regulation establishes different penalties. Due to that fact, those 
companies are satisfactorily purchasing their required amounts in all the OMIP call 
auctions. According to the legislation mentioned in the Introduction (“Orders ITC”), 
the cost of the energy purchased by the Spanish Distribution Companies in the 
OMIP call auctions is recognised through the resulting equilibrium price of each call 
auction. 
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Figure 2. “Evolution of resulting Weighted Average Equilibrium Prices in OMIP Call Auctions 
versus Average Underlying Spot Prices”. Source: OMIP, OMIE 
Since the start of OMIP (in terms of quarterly periods, from Q4-06), all the 
auctioned settled contracts have experienced positive Forward Risk Premia until 
October 2007 (in terms of quarterly periods, until Q4-07), when a trend change is 
appreciated and negative Risk Premia become dominant during quarters Q4-07 and 
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Q1-08. The Forward Risk Premium is again positive along Q2-08, but again 
negative along Q3-08, as shown in Figure 2 (dotted lines separate those price 
trends). This chart shows that OMIP Forward Risk Premium tends to diminish with 
time, and it is alternating positive and negative values more frequently, therefore 
price efficiency is improved with OMIP market development. 
As the purchasing costs for the distribution companies are recognised, Test 1 
assesses the costs of OMIP auctions distinguishing between monthly and quarterly 
contracts. Additionally, as calendar futures contract with delivery during year 2008 
(FTB YR-08) has also been traded in such OMIP Call Auctions, estimation of the 
costs is also calculated for this contract considering the available spot data so far, 
i.e., from January 2008 to September 2008. Three different reference prices are 
employed: 
 Resulting Auction Equilibrium Price (“Feq”): this is the price recognised to 
the distribution companies, as stated above. It is calculated as the weighted 
average price of all the volumes acquired by the distribution companies in 
the call auctions celebrated for each futures contract. 
 Average Futures Price for all the quotation period (“Fall”): this is the average 
price of all the Daily Settlement Prices published by OMIP along the whole 
quotation period of the futures contract. The algorithm employed by OMIP 
for determining the Daily Settlement Price, based on the traded prices and 
the bid-ask spread, is described in Section C.6 (Settlement Price 
Calculation) of OMIP OMIClear Operational Guide (version of June 2008). 
OMIP is the Market Operator and OMIClear is the Clearinghouse of the 
Iberian Power Futures Market. The algorithm can be summarised as follows: 
o The Settlement Price for a futures contract is the last traded price if 
it is within the closing bid-ask spread 
o If the last traded price during the trading session is not situated in 
the closing bid-ask spread, the settlement price is the bid or ask 
price closest to the last traded price. 
o If there is no traded price during the trading session, the settlement 
price is the average of the bid-ask corresponding to the closing 
spread. 
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o If there is no traded price during the trading session, and no closing 
bid-ask spread, the settlement price corresponds to the settlement 
price of the previous trading session. 
o Nonetheless, when OMIP does not rely on the resulting price due to 
scarce negotiation of the contract, OMIP consults a Price Committee 
– composed voluntarily by Trading Members – and the daily price is 
obtained from representative quotations of the OTC market. 
Additionally, OMIP often employs the arbitrage criterion between a 
quarterly contract and their comprised monthly ones, to obtain the 
settlement prices by using weighted averages among these 4 
contracts. It also applies arbitrage criterion between a calendar 
contract and their comprised quarterly ones. This is due to the fact 
that as other forward market mechanisms coexist with OMIP call 
auctions within MIBEL context (Virtual Power Plant auctions – “VPP 
auctions” –, known in Spanish as “Emisiones Primarias de Energía” 
or “EPE auctions”, and Last Resort Supply auctions or “CESUR 
auctions” from the Spanish expression “Contratos de Energía para 
los Suministros de Último Recurso”), the most traded contracts in 
OMIP are the prompt months and quarterly ones (quarterly contracts 
with the same maturity as those from EPE and CESUR auctions), 
being the settlement prices of the least traded contracts in OMIP 
obtained through this arbitrage criterion. 
 Average Spot price (“S”): this is the average price resulting from the 
Spanish Power Pool day ahead prices and corresponding to the whole 
delivery period of the considered futures contract. This Power Pool is 
managed by OMIE (known traditionally as “OMEL”).  
4.2 Results 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of Δex-post % according to the three reference prices 
stated in the Methodology and the two quotation periods considered.  
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OMIP Risk Premia (AvgeFM-AvgeSdeliv)/AvgeFM % 
for Monthly Contracts with different Reference Prices
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for Quarterly Contracts with different Reference Prices
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Figure 3. “OMIP Risk Premia in different quotation periods with different Reference Prices”. 
Source: OMIP, OMIE 
From Figure 3 it can be observed – especially for the monthly contracts – that Fall 
provides smaller economic values both for the positive and negative premia periods 
than the official recognised price (Feq), as Fall presents smaller positive forward risk 
premia and bigger negative ones (in absolute value) than Feq. Therefore, the total 
economic costs do differ depending on which futures price is considered as 
reference. Additionally, from Figure 3 it can be seen that Forward Risk Premium 
with Fall is less than Forward Risk Premium with Feq along year 2008.  
Another analysis is performed for the total economic costs by distinguishing per 
contract type (monthly versus quarterly), as shown in Table 1. From Table 1, it can 
be seen that the costs of monthly contracts are 2,7% higher (2,2% higher for the 
quarterly contracts) considering the official recognised price (Feq) instead of the 
average quotation price (Fall). Such differences in the costs show that there may 
slightly be more competitive pressure in OMIP call auctions for the quarterly 
contracts than for the monthly ones. This can be provoked by the interaction with 
the other coexisting MIBEL market mechanisms (EPE and CESUR auctions above 
mentioned) where quarterly contracts are also traded. However, this claim is not so 
strong as Feq has resulted bigger than Fall for the already expired quarterly 
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contracts of year 2008 (from Q1-08 to Q3-08). This last difference is justified by 
the fact that these quarterly contracts began to quote in OMIP since the beginning 
of 2007 at very lower prices than in their last quotation months, due to the large 
impact of the historically maximum values experienced by the oil prices in those 
last quotation months (first half of 2008; the record oil price (spot) has been 
produced on July 3rd:  144,22 $/Bbl). In order to draw stronger and more accurate 
conclusions, further research is encouraged by considering weighted average 
futures prices of OMIP Settlement Prices with the OMIP trading sessions where 
trades occurred. Additionally, it is interesting to see that for the whole considered 
period and taking into account the yearly contract, the total cost obtained through 
Fall is similar to the cost in case that energy were purchased at the spot price. 
When considering Feq, the total cost is still bigger than the cost derived from 
considering the spot price, due to the slight upward bias of Feq aforementioned.  
Costs Assessment of energy purchased in OMIP Auctions by Spanish Distribution Companies 
Contract Type MWh € Fall € Feq € Spot 
Monthly 13.896.691 776.330.384 797.165.235 741.443.752 
Quarterly 9.467.856 489.434.596 499.984.271 496.722.862 
Yearly 2.051.400 105.365.705 105.788.989 132.151.757 
Total 25.415.947 1.371.130.686 1.402.938.495 1.370.318.371 
Table 1. “Costs assessment of Energy purchased in OMIP Call Auctions by Spanish 
Distribution Companies. Distinction per contract type”. Source: OMIP, OMIE 
From the results obtained, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
 In the short term, until enough liquidity is reached in OMIP continuous 
market, it seems reasonable to continue arranging compulsory call auctions 
for the Spanish Distribution Companies. Nonetheless, the equilibrium price 
(Feq), used for the settlement of the purchased contracts, is resulting 
slightly higher compared to the average of settlement prices along the 
trading period of the contract (Fall). According to OMIP trading limits for 
mitigating the members’ credit risk – as theoretically defined in Section 
B2.12 Daily Price Variation Limits of OMIP Operational Guide and practically 
specified in OMIP Notice 04/2006 regarding Maximum Price Variation Limits 
– accepted bids and offers must be contained within an interval centered on 
the Trading Session Reference Price, i.e. the resulting Settlement Price of 
the previous session. In the case of yearly and quarterly contracts, the 
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interval spans from the reference price ±6% (±9% for monthly contracts; 
±15% for weekly contracts). Spanish Distribution Companies and 
Portuguese Last Resort Supplier submit their compulsory bids in OMIP call 
auctions at the price given by the upper limit of the interval, in order to 
ensure that their bids are matched, and provoking that competition only 
arises from the sales side. If they submitted their bids at a maximum price 
which is somehow less, the resulting equilibrium price might diminish, as 
desired in terms of economic costs to the regulated supplies. Therefore, it 
might make sense that as soon as the settlement price of the previous 
session is determined, OMIP and MIBEL Regulators Committee may agree 
upon a cap price for the compulsory call auction of the following day. Such a 
cap price would be carefully calculated per auction, in order to get the 
desired effect on the auction equilibrium price without preventing 
competition on the sales curve. The cap price would only apply for the 
compulsory call auction, not for the continuous market, in order to limit 
such a regulatory intervention. For the sake of transparency, the auction 
cap price should be published in OMIP bulletin together with the results of 
the trading session previous to the compulsory call auction. This daily 
bulletin shows currently, per negotiated futures contract, all the traded 
volumes in OMIP continuous market, compulsory call auctions, and OTC 
settled by OMIClear. Furthermore, last traded price, open price, daily high 
and low prices, closing bid-ask spread, aggregated traded volumes 
distinguishing between financially and physically settled contracts (excluding 
OTC settled by OMIClear), and open interest are also shown.    
 It may be reasonable to continue offering compulsory quantities via OMIP 
call auctions to distribution companies or last resort suppliers until desired 
liquidity levels are reached in the continuos market. At that stage, the 
Settlement Price published by OMIP should accurately reflect market prices 
and could be better utilised for the calculation of last resort supply costs. 
Distribution companies or last resort suppliers would then be able to cover 
their forward energy needs through OMIP continuous market. Therefore, 
further compulsory OMIP call auctions would no longer be necessary. 
Additionally, the competitive nature of the continuous market would 
theoretically provide smaller prices than compulsory auctions, making the 
supply costs more affordable to last resort suppliers.     
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5 Test 2: Analysis of Basic Statistics of Futures & Spot Prices 
5.1 Methodology 
Basic statistics (Average, Median, Maximum, Minimum, Standard Deviation, 
Asymmetry Coefficient, and Kurtosis) for the monthly and quarterly futures 
contracts and their underlying average spot prices are provided in order to 
compare all the energy markets considered. The data set is comprised of the 
arithmetical mean values for the settlement prices of each Futures contract during 
its quotation period. For the corresponding spot price, arithmetical mean for the 
underlying delivery period is calculated. 
5.2 Results 
Table 2 and 3 show basic statistics for the monthly and quarterly futures prices 
respectively: 
  Basic Statistics of Average Reference Prices of Monthly Contracts & Underlying Spot Prices. Period: Aug.06-Sep.08
  OMIP (€/MWh) 
Powernext 
(€/MWh) 
Nord Pool 
(€/MWh) 
NBP (GB 
p/therm) 
Brent  
(US $/Bbl) 
EEX ARA  
(US $/t) 
  Future Spot Future Spot Future Spot Future Spot Future Spot Future Spot 
Average 52,74 48,72 55,99 49,94 43,95 37,88 48,15 39,85 66,07 84,00 92,60 110,04 
Median 54,97 45,81 57,37 44,26 45,57 37,12 45,53 35,96 63,45 76,94 74,55 89,69 
Max 67,44 73,03 82,89 88,43 63,17 67,47 80,08 69,87 81,99 133,18 169,31 209,73 
Min 38,35 29,68 27,87 27,02 23,77 16,53 26,48 16,24 51,02 53,91 62,63 65,70 
Std.Dev. 8,73 13,64 16,24 19,61 12,09 14,94 15,12 16,27 7,39 23,75 32,46 45,52 
Asymmetry -0,22 0,44 -0,06 0,45 -0,12 0,51 0,64 0,20 0,44 0,70 1,06 0,75 
Kurtosis -0,97 -1,20 -0,96 -1,04 -1,07 -0,65 0 -1,39 0,11 -0,51 -0,07 -0,70 
Table 2. “Basic Statistics of Fall & Underlying Spot Prices of Monthly Future Contracts during 
period Aug.06-Sep.08”. Sources: OMIP, OMIE, Powernext, Nord Pool, Platts, ICE, EEX, Argus 
Mc Kloskey.  
From the information reflected in the tables, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: 
 Within each market and comparing Futures with Spot values, the same 
behaviour is detected for monthly and quarterly contracts, except for 
Asymmetry and Kurtosis. Nevertheless, as the data set is quite limited 
(especially for quarterly contracts), such differences are not relevant.  
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  Basic Statistics of Average Reference Prices of Quarterly Contracts & Underlying Spot Prices. Period: Q4 06 - Q3-08 
  OMIP  (€/MWh) 
Powernext 
(€/MWh) 
Nord Pool 
(€/MWh) 
NBP  
(GB p/therm) 
EEX ARA  
(US $/t) 
  Future Spot Future Spot Future Spot Future Spot Future Spot 
Average 52,39 48,69 54,96 50,92 40,38 35,56 49,18 40,62 76,19 113,64 
Median 51,77 43,47 53,96 52,61 40,01 36,29 44,50 38,75 71,30 104,45 
Max 58,57 70,41 70,06 72,71 48,72 55,38 76,11 61,48 98,44 192,82 
Min 46,57 35,70 41,08 29,35 33,34 19,74 30,36 20,20 66,14 67,39 
Std.Dev. 4,30 14,04 10,73 19,63 5,08 12,18 15,62 16,88 11,45 46,88 
Asymmetry 0,15 0,65 0,16 -0,04 0,42 0,22 0,94 0,09 1,24 0,62 
Kurtosis -1,57 -1,44 -1,54 -2,42 -0,41 -0,81 -0,13 -2,02 0,70 -0,99 
Table 3. “Basic Statistics of Fall & Underlying Spot Prices of Quarterly Future Contracts during 
period Q4.06-Q3.08”. Sources: OMIP, OMIE, Powernext, Nord Pool, Platts, ICE, EEX, Argus 
Mc Kloskey.  
 The Average Risk Premia are positive in Power and Gas Markets, but 
negative in Oil and Coal Markets. To be more precise, in Power and Gas 
Markets the average Risk Premia of positive values tend to be bigger in 
absolute value than average Risk Premia of negative values. In Oil and Coal 
Markets, the average Risk Premia of negative values tend to be bigger in 
absolute value than average Risk Premia of positive values. 
 According to standard deviation values, spot markets show bigger volatility 
than their related future markets. Due to that bigger volatility, more 
extreme values are presented in spot markets, with the exceptions of 
maximum values in gas forward market and minimum values in oil and coal 
futures markets. The biggest spreads (Futures versus Spot) regarding 
maximum values are produced for the oil and coal markets. 
 In general, Asymmetry tends to be positive and Kurtosis tends to be 
negative.  
 Although not reflected in the tables, similar results are obtained from OMIP 
Feq as those shown for OMIP Fall. 
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6 Test 3: Comparison of Futures Behaviour towards Maturity 
6.1 Methodology 
For all the markets considered, distinguishing between monthly and quarterly 
futures contracts, and per approach to maturity (all quotation period (“Fall”), third 
last month of quotation (“FM-3”), second last month of quotation (“FM-2”), and last 
month of quotation (“FM-1”)), different magnitudes are compared: 
 Assessment of similar behaviour between Monthly and Quarterly Contracts 
 Quantitative comparison of Δex-post % between Monthly and Quarterly 
Contracts, and between Periods with positive or negative values 
 Correlation between Futures Series (Fall versus FM-3, FM-2, or FM-1) 
 Samuelson’s hypothesis (1965): “Volatility increases as Futures contracts 
approach maturity” 
 Increasing convergence to spot price (less Δex-post % in absolute value) with 
maturity 
OMIP Risk Premia (AvgeFM-AvgeSdeliv)/AvgeFM % 
for Monthly Contracts in different quotation periods
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Figure 4. “OMIP Forward Risk Premia distinguishing Reference Prices per approach to 
maturity”. Sources: OMIP, OMIE. 
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6.2 Results 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the Forward Risk Premia (in percentage) for both 
monthly and quarterly OMIP futures contracts, considering the 4 series of futures 
prices: Fall, FM-3, FM-2, and FM-1.  Figures 5-9 show respectively the equivalent 
information for the rest of considered energy markets in this research, namely, 
Powernext, Nord Pool, NBP Gas, Brent, and EEX ARA Coal. 
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Figure 5. “Powernext Forward Risk Premia distinguishing Reference Prices per approach to 
maturity”. Source: Powernext. 
By analysing all these charts, various trends are detected. The following 
conclusions can be drawn from Figures 4-9: 
 Monthly and Quarterly contracts have similar Forward Risk Premium 
variation trends coinciding with alternant periods of positive Δex-post % or 
negative Δex-post %. In the case of power markets, a general trend change 
(“positive to negative”) is produced in autumn 2007.  
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Nord Pool Risk Premia 
(AvgeFQ-AvgeSdeliv)/AvgeFQ % for
Quarterly Contracts in
 different quotation periods
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Nord Pool Risk Premia (AvgeFM-AvgeSdeliv)/AvgeFM %
 for Monthly Contracts in different quotation periods
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Figure 6. “Nord Pool Forward Risk Premia distinguishing Reference Prices per approach to 
maturity”. Source: Nord Pool. 
NBP Gas Risk Premia (AvgeFM-AvgeSdeliv)/AvgeFM %
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Figure 7. “NBP Gas Forward Risk Premia distinguishing Reference Prices per approach to 
maturity”. Sources: ICE, Platts. 
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Brent Risk Premia (AvgeFM-AvgeSdeliv)/AvgeFM % for 
Monthly Contracts in different quotation periods
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Figure 8. “Brent Forward Risk Premia distinguishing Reference Prices per approach to 
maturity”. Sources: ICE, Platts. 
EEX ARA Coal Risk Premia (AvgeFM-AvgeSdeliv)/AvgeFM %
 for Monthly Contracts in different quotation periods
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Figure 9. “EEX ARA Coal Forward Risk Premia distinguishing Reference Prices per approach to 
maturity”. Sources: EEX, Argus Mc Kloskey. 
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 Quantitative variations of Δex-post % are similar for monthly and quarterly 
contracts. Whereas monthly average values tend to be slightly smaller than 
quarterly ones, extreme monthly values tend to be somewhat bigger than 
quarterly ones, explained by slightly bigger volatility of the monthly values 
(measured in terms of standard deviation). Regarding extreme variations, 
the smallest ones occur for OMIP (around ±40%), and the biggest for NBP 
(around ±70%). 
 Whereas Δex-post % positive is dominant in power and gas markets, Δex-post % 
negative is dominant in oil and coal markets, supposing different hedging 
strategies within each market. In absolute value, average positive Δex-post % 
tends to be slightly bigger than average negative Δex-post %. Regarding 
extreme variations, in absolute value, negative Δex-post % tends to be slightly 
bigger than positive Δex-post %  
 Correlation between Futures Series (Fall with each of the 3 series FM-3, FM-2, 
or FM-1) – analysing separately monthly and quarterly futures contracts – is 
only significant in EEX ARA Coal (correlation coefficient around 0,99). In the 
case of Power Markets, for the monthly contracts the correlation coefficients 
are around 0,90 and for the quarterly contracts, the correlation coefficients 
are around 0,70. Smaller coefficients for quarterly contracts can be caused 
by the limited data set (8 values) compared to wider monthly data set (26 
values). Comparing Power Markets, Powernext presents the biggest 
correlation coefficients and Nord Pool the smallest ones. For NBP Gas, 
correlation coefficients are around 0,60 for monthly and quarterly contracts. 
For Brent, correlation coefficients are around 0,90 (monthly contracts). For 
all the markets, the least correlation is produced between Fall and FM-1 (i.e. 
correlation tends to diminish as futures contracts approach maturity). 
 Samuelson’s maturity effect (increasing volatility when maturity 
approaches) is noticeable in all the markets considered except for the 
British gas market. 
 Increasing convergence to spot price with maturity is fulfilled by all time 
series (trend towards smallest Δex-post % in absolute value, when comparing, 
in this sequence, FM-3, FM-2, and FM-1). Monthly and quarterly contracts are 
analysed separately, where comparison of Δex-post % in absolute value is 
 doi:10.3926/jiem.2008.v1n2.p209-239  ©© JIEM, 2008 – 01(02): 209-239 – ISSN: 2013-0953 
 
Empirical evaluation of the efficiency of the Iberian power futures market 231 
A. Capitán Herráiz; C. Rodríguez Monroy 
separately done for positive Δex-post % and negative Δex-post %. The 
convergence with maturity is caused due to lack of accuracy in oldest 
quoted futures prices, as less information was then available in the market.  
7 Test 4: Bessembinder’s & Lemmon’s Hypothesis Compliance 
7.1 Methodology 
For each futures contract type (monthly and quarterly, distinguishing between Fall, 
FM-3, FM-2, FM-1) of the three considered European Power Markets, testable 
hypothesis from Bessembinder & Lemmon (2002) is checked by using Δex-post as the 
power prices in the three markets are commonly expressed in €/MWh: 
Δex-post  = Ft,T - Average(ST) 
Equation 4. “Ex-post Forward Risk Premium”. Source: e.g. Bessembinder & Lemmon, 2002. 
The testable hypothesis is as follows:  “The Forward Risk Premium decreases in the 
variance of spot prices and increases in the skewness of wholesale prices”. In order 
to test the hypothesis, linear regression is applied according to: 
Δex-post   = α + β*VAR(ST)+γ*ASIM(ST)+εT  
Equation 5. “Bessembinder’s & Lemmon’s ex-post testable hypothesis”. Source: Furió & 
Meneu, 2007. 
Where α is a constant, β and γ are coefficients, VAR(ST) reflects the variance of 
spot prices, ASIM(ST) represents the non-standardised Asymmetry Coefficient 
(“skewness”) of spot prices (it is the Asymmetry Coefficient multiplied by cubed 
Standard Deviation of Spot Prices), and εT is an error term. 
Good compliance should render negative β, positive γ, with significant values for 
their t-statistics, as well as a high value of R2 statistic. For the t-Student tests, a 
level of confidence of 95% with 2 tails is considered. 
7.2 Results 
Table 4 summarises the results of applying multifactor linear regression: 
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Bessembinder Lemmon hypothesis compliance for  
ex-post Forward Risk Premium in Power Markets   
OMIP M Contracts                
Quot.Period α β γ R2 t tα tβ tγ 
All 3,10 0,0557 -0,0049 0,46% 2,07 0,90 0,30 -0,17 
M-3 3,47 0,0359 -0,0008 0,24% 2,08 0,82 0,15 -0,02 
M-2 4,28 -0,0028 -0,0006 0,01% 2,07 1,26 -0,02 -0,02 
M-1 2,55 0,0606 -0,0069 1% 2,07 1,09 0,48 -0,35 
OMIP Q Contracts                
Quot.Period α β γ R2 t tα tβ tγ 
All -0,43 0,1144 -0,0026 6,20% 2,57 -0,04 0,24 -0,04 
M-3 3,39 -0,0001 0,0035 0,63% 2,57 0,34 0,00 0,06 
M-2 2,54 0,1278 -0,0181 2,42% 2,57 0,28 0,33 -0,35 
M-1 1,03 0,2067 -0,0340 12,27% 2,57 0,13 0,62 -0,78 
Powernext M Contracts             
Quot.Period α β γ R2 t tα tβ tγ 
All 18,38 -0,0653 0,0003 60,11% 2,07 5,47 -4,02 2,82 
M-3 22,51 -0,0901 0,0004 65,44% 2,07 6,09 -5,05 3,83 
M-2 19,59 -0,0679 0,0003 59,31% 2,07 5,32 -3,81 2,61 
M-1 12,70 -0,0363 0,0001 43,33% 2,07 3,84 -2,27 1,32 
Powernext Q Contracts             
Quot.Period α β γ R2 t tα tβ tγ 
All 26,52 -0,1194 0,0007 75,51% 2,57 3,56 -3,29 2,61 
M-3 25,10 -0,0960 0,0005 70,59% 2,57 3,08 -2,42 1,67 
M-2 25,27 -0,0854 0,0004 68,82% 2,57 2,96 -2,05 1,28 
M-1 17,77 -0,0492 0,0001 65,41% 2,57 2,33 -1,33 0,54 
Nord Pool M Contracts             
Quot.Period α β γ R2 t tα tβ tγ 
All 11,53 -0,2426 0,0056 13,38% 2,07 2,95 -1,86 0,16 
M-3 11,67 -0,2545 0,0124 10,42% 2,07 2,49 -1,63 0,30 
M-2 9,47 -0,2099 0,0015 12,91% 2,07 2,71 -1,81 0,05 
M-1 4,96 -0,0896 -0,0095 8,76% 2,07 2,28 -1,24 -0,50 
Nord Pool Q Contracts             
Quot.Period α β γ R2 t tα tβ tγ 
All 18,01 -0,2608 -0,0150 66,30% 2,57 3,49 -3,03 -0,76 
M-3 19,75 -0,2117 -0,0089 22,84% 2,57 1,79 -1,15 -0,21 
M-2 13,08 -0,0580 0,0139 9,18% 2,57 1,32 -0,35 0,37 
M-1 7,32 0,0421 0,0328 21,58% 2,57 0,97 0,34 1,14 
Table 4. “Regression results regarding compliance with Bessembinder’s & Lemmon’s 
Hypothesis”. Sources: OMIP, OMIE, Powernext and Nord Pool. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the results summarised in Table 4: 
 In general, there is relatively poor compliance for the three power markets. 
No significant differences are obtained between the four Futures series 
considered for each market. In the case of OMIP, similar results are also 
obtained by using Feq instead of Fall. Although the quarterly contracts are 
composed of a limited data set per serie (8 values versus 26 of the monthly 
contracts), R2 statistic is larger for the quarterly contracts.  
 OMIP is the least compliant market, as for both monthly and quarterly 
contracts, coefficient signs for β and γ are not right as expected from the 
testable hypothesis, R2 statistic results too low, and t-Student tests 
(significant values for the coefficients) are not satisfactory. 
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 Powernext is the best compliant market in general, as coefficient signs are 
right, R2 statistic renders reasonable level, and t-Student tests are mostly 
satisfactory.   
 Nord Pool has a medium compliance only for monthly contracts, as for those 
contracts the coefficient signs tend to be right and t-Student tests are partly 
satisfactory. On the other hand, reasonable values for R2 statistic are only 
found for the quarterly contracts.   
8 Reflections about the efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures Market 
This Section intends to provide a qualitative analysis of the price efficiency in the 
Iberian Power Futures Market compared with other electricity markets, 
complementing the quantitative findings of the empirical reasearch described in 
previous Sections. 
 
Samuelson’s maturity effect is noticeable in almost all the energy markets 
considered. This can be caused by the fact that in all these markets there is already 
an equilibrated mix regarding the trading behaviour of market players (i.e. an 
adequate proportion of hedgers, speculators, and hybrid players whose behaviour 
rests between the former ones). In the case of OMIP, such a mix proportion is 
fulfilled and it seems that there is still much room for new entrants already 
participating in coexisting forward contracting mechanisms (OTC market, VPP 
auctions, and CESUR auctions aforementioned). Those potential OMIP trading 
members belong to the trading categories described above (hedgers: mainly large 
industrial customers; hybrid: independent energy traders already active in other 
more mature European power exchanges; speculators: financial entities). The 
irruption of new members in OMIP would surely bring higher levels of liquidity and 
presumably better price efficiency. 
 
According to literature review, differences in market organisation and structure 
cause a heterogeneous development of efficiency levels between neighbouring 
electricity markets. Regulatory efforts done by the European Regulators Group for 
Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) within the European Union in order to streamline the 
integration of regional energy markets will also contribute towards higher levels of 
efficiency in the Iberian Power Futures Market. In this sense, along year 2009 the 
Power Exchanges Powernext (France) and EEX (Germany) will merge their spot and 
 doi:10.3926/jiem.2008.v1n2.p209-239  ©© JIEM, 2008 – 01(02): 209-239 – ISSN: 2013-0953 
 
Empirical evaluation of the efficiency of the Iberian power futures market 234 
A. Capitán Herráiz; C. Rodríguez Monroy 
futures markets. Synergies from both markets will cause efficiency improvements 
in their market areas and will positively affect the efficiency of the Iberian Power 
Futures Market. In order to leverage such potential efficiency gains, further 
regulatory efforts towards the development of auction mechanisms for the French-
Spanish interconnection are desired. On the other hand, the Iberian power and gas 
markets are strongly interdependent due to the large participation of electricity and 
gas trading companies in both markets and the big development of gas 
infrastructures, combined cycle gas turbines and cogeneration plants in the last 
years. Therefore, every improvement regarding regulatory harmonization between 
Spain and Portugal within the MIBEL and the Iberian Gas Market (the so-called 
MIBGAS) frameworks will also improve the efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures 
Market.  
 
As previously mentioned, the compulsory call auctions managed by OMIP are a 
transitory mechanism to foster liquidity in this young market. The competitive 
nature of those auctions only on selling side makes that their price efficiency is 
somehow limited. Nonetheless, once satisfactory liquidity levels are reached within 
the Iberian Power Futures Market, it is assumed that the degree of efficiency of the 
continuous market will be quite positive. At that stage, it deserves to measure such 
efficiency considering the weighted average futures prices for the trading sessions 
where volumes are negotiated. Actually, such weighted average prices are the 
most natural price indicator to measure the price efficiency of the market. Due to 
the nascent nature of this market with small initial liquidity, it was preferred to 
employ other reference prices (Feq and Fall). Some inherent price abnormalities 
from these two indicators have undermined the desired levels of efficiency: in the 
case of Feq, the fixed price from distribution companies on the demand side as 
previously mentioned, and in the case of Fall, the fact that in many sessions at the 
beginning of OMIP the settlement price was not determined by real trading prices 
(but by any of the other possibilities of the Methodology described before, e.g., the 
closing spread). Further research is encouraged regarding measurements of the 
price efficiency using the best price indicator (i.e. the weighted average price) 
confirming the gradual improvement of the efficiency of this market caused by the 
liquidity improvements in the last months.   
It is interesting to remark that the design of these compulsory call auctions does 
not resemble any previous similar experience in other pioneering energy 
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derivatives markets. Therefore it is impossible to judge its convenience by directly 
comparing with analogous cases. On the other hand, it was previously mentioned 
that other coexistent forward mechanisms exist within MIBEL framework, namely 
the OTC market, the EPE or VPP auctions, and CESUR or Bilateral Contracting 
auctions. These two auctions mechanisms within MIBEL context have been 
designed taking into account previous experiences in other markets (e.g., VPP 
auctions are consolidated mechanisms in European power markets, like the French, 
Dutch and Danish ones, and auctions for catering regulated supplies have been 
previously applied in some US regional markets, as Maryland and New Jersey). 
Many players active in these coexistent forward mechanisms within MIBEL may use 
the OMIP platform as a hedge vehicle. Therefore, efficiency gains within MIBEL are 
expected from a sound regulatory orchestration regarding appropriate supervision 
of all these market mechanisms. Further research is encouraged to measure in 
particular if the development of these two other auction mechanisms has brought 
improved efficiency in the Iberian Power Futures Market managed by OMIP.     
9 Conclusions 
Market efficiency is analysed for the Iberian Power Futures Markets and other 
European power markets (Powernext and Nord Pool) and fuel markets (Brent, NBP 
Natural Gas, and EEX ARA Coal) through evaluation of ex-post Forward Risk 
Premium. The equilibrium price in OMIP compulsory call auctions for distribution 
companies is not optimal for remuneration purposes as the purchasing costs for 
regulated supplies tend to be slightly higher than those from OMIP average 
settlement prices along the whole quotation period, though such a premium is not 
significant (only around 2% above). A regulated cap price for each OMIP 
compulsory call auction could be transitorily applied in order to obtain a lower 
equilibrium price and therefore diminish regulated costs of supply. Once OMIP 
continuous market has acceptable liquidity, the settlement price itself would reflect 
more accurately the market prices and could be used for evaluating the cost of last 
resort supplies. In the period considered (August 2006 to September 2008), 
monthly futures contracts have a similar behaviour as  quarterly contracts and 
average risk premia have been positive in power markets (especially until Q4-07) 
and in gas markets but negative in oil and coal markets. In all the examined 
markets, the Forward Risk Premium for a futures contract tends to diminish as it 
approaches maturity. Samuelson’s maturity effect – increasing volatility with 
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maturity – is noticeable in all the markets except for the British gas market. 
Compliance with Bessembinder’s & Lemmon’s testable hypothesis regarding 
Forward Risk Premium correlations in Power Markets (negative with variance of 
spot prices, and positive with skewness of spot prices) is relatively low. Further 
research is proposed considering an enlarged data set (especially with quarterly 
contracts) to better test all the hypotheses and draw additional conclusions. 
Inclusion of calendar contracts may make sense, in order to avoid seasonality 
effects, although such series are still reduced if OMIP starting point (July 2006) is 
considered. In general, it can be concluded that none of the markets analysed 
presents a noticeable level of market efficiency as remarkable forward risk premia 
exist in all the markets. Regarding Power Markets, the behaviour of OMIP Futures 
Prices does not differ much in terms of efficiency compared to more mature 
markets (Powernext and Nord Pool). Although liquidity is still poor in the Iberian 
Power Futures Market, its price efficiency has improved along with OMIP market 
development and will increase with further integration of European Power Regional 
Markets.    
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